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In his correspondence, John Locke described his close friend Damaris Masham as ‘a 
determined foe to ecclesiastical tyranny’ and someone who had ‘the greatest aversion to 
all persecution on account of religious matters.’ In her short biography of Locke, 
Masham returned the compliment by commending Locke for convincing others that 
‘Liberty of Conscience is the unquestionable Right of Mankind.’ These comments attest 
to Masham’s personal commitment to the cause of religious liberty. Thus far, however, 
there has been no scholarly discussion of the tolerationist ethic underlying Masham’s 
1705 publication, Occasional Thoughts.   In this chapter, I argue that Masham’s work 
appeals to three common tolerationist principles of her time: the idea that the authorities 
should not use coercion and penalties as ways of imposing religious beliefs on others; the 
view that God requires human beings to attain salvation through their own efforts, and 
not by blindly following the dictates of the state-established religion; and the idea that the 





society. I show that Masham goes further than her tolerationist contemporaries by 
arguing that together these principles imply that a woman’s intellectual education—or the 
conscious cultivation of a woman’s ability to reflect critically on her religious beliefs—is 
vital for the good of the commonwealth. 
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Damaris Masham on Women and Liberty of Conscience 
 
In a 1691 letter to the Dutch Remonstrant, Philippus van Limborch (1633-1712), John 
Locke (1632-1704) writes that 
My hostess is a determined foe to ecclesiastical tyranny.…  It is in vain, she 
believes, that so much noise is made everywhere about the reform of religion and 
the spreading of the Gospel so long as tyranny in the Church—force in matters of 
religion—as is generally the custom prevails under other names however specious 
and is commended.1 
Locke’s ‘hostess’ at this time was his close friend Damaris Cudworth Masham (1659-
1708), and in this letter he also conveys Masham’s interest in seeing the complete volume 
of Limborch’s Historia Inquisitionis (1692), a history of religious persecution in Europe. 
These comments attest to Masham’s personal commitment to the cause of religious 
toleration. In her lifetime, Masham wrote two short treatises of her own, A Discourse 
concerning the Love of God (1696) and Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous 
or Christian Life (1705), both of which were published anonymously.2 Neither of these 
works has been studied for its opposition to ‘ecclesiastical tyranny’ or ‘force in matters of 
religion.’  In this paper, I argue that Masham’s second work, the Occasional Thoughts, 
constitutes an original contribution to the early eighteenth-century discussion about 
liberty of conscience (or liberty of worship) in England.3  
Today Masham is not typically thought of as a political writer, even though she 
makes explicit political comments in both her letters and her final treatise, the Occasional 





of Masham’s Occasional Thoughts and Locke’s Letter concerning Toleration (first 
published in Latin as Epistola de Tolerantia in 1689). But Hutton simply observes that 
like Locke in the Letter, Masham ‘values virtuous living more highly than religious 
ceremonial.’5  More recently, Regan Penaluna argues in favor of seeing Occasional 
Thoughts as a political text with a definite program for social reform.6  And James 
Buickerood has pointed to Masham’s early commitment to toleration in her letters to 
Locke.7  In his recent history of toleration, John Locke, Toleration, and Early 
Enlightenment Culture (2006), John Marshall also describes Masham as a ‘tolerationist 
author,’ but without explanation or evidence.8  So far, no one has interpreted Masham’s 
final book in light of its engagement with the topical political themes of toleration and 
liberty of conscience. 
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the historical-intellectual background to 
Masham’s work, and provide a brief account of Masham’s association with the famous 
‘republic of letters’ devoted to universal religious toleration and enlightenment in late 
seventeenth-century Europe.9  In the second part, I demonstrate that Masham expresses a 
commitment to three common tolerationist principles of her time: the view that 
authorities should not use coercion and penalties as ways of imposing religious beliefs on 
others; the idea that God requires human beings to attain salvation through their own 
efforts, and not by blindly following the dictates of the state-established religion; and the 
view that the granting of liberty of conscience helps to ensure the peace and stability of 
society. In the third and final part, I show that Masham argues that together these 





woman’s ability to reflect critically on her religious beliefs—is vital to the flourishing of 
the commonwealth.  
Before I begin, I would like to propose a brief revision to the standard histories of 
political thought for this period. In his authoritative work, John Marshall observes that 
while the ethos of the republic of letters ‘held it open to both ladies and gentlemen, in 
these years [the late seventeenth century] female participants in its discussions and 
publications were relatively rare.’10  A quick survey of the evidence shows that this is not 
strictly true.   Masham was not the only early modern English woman to express her 
views about religious liberty and toleration in print. A few decades earlier, Margaret 
Cavendish (1623-73) had argued that, for the sake of peace and social harmony, subjects 
ought to be permitted liberty of conscience on the condition that they do not meddle with 
government.11  During and after the Glorious Revolution (1688-89), women were also 
active participants (on both sides) in the toleration debates—among them Elinor James 
(c. 1645-1719), Joan Whitrowe (fl. 1665-97), and Anne Docwra (c. 1624-1710).12 Some 
of these women echoed the calls for liberty of conscience of their civil war predecessors, 
such as Katherine Chidley and the Leveller women petitioners of the 1640s.  In 
Masham’s own time, Mary Astell (1666-1731) was an active pamphleteer on the anti-
tolerationist side: in several anonymous tracts of 1704, she supported the conservative 
Tory position against the practice of occasional conformity.13 And in the eighteenth 
century, Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679-1749) defended Locke’s Christian credentials 
with reference to his Letter concerning Toleration. Cockburn cites Locke’s argument that 
‘the less bias was put upon men’s minds, either by civil advantages or disadvantages, the 





argument that Masham also expresses in her work.14 These women all had something to 
contribute to the intellectual debates out of which our modern-day concept of toleration 
emerged; and their contributions—as modest as they sometimes were—are part of the 
complex history of tolerationist thought and practice.  They are not so rare to warrant 
omission. I hope to show that Masham, moreover, is unique among her contemporaries in 
one important respect: she offers the only early eighteenth-century discourse about liberty 
of conscience to consider the implications for women’s intellectual education.15 
 
1. The Historical and Intellectual Background  
Though Occasional Thoughts was published in 1705, in her Preface Masham says that 
the manuscript ‘was written some years since’ but that it had lain by ‘for above two Years 
unread, and almost forgotten’ (OT, sig. A2r). So it would appear that the work was 
originally composed in about 1702-03, a period of intense political controversy about the 
practice of occasional conformity and the toleration of non-conformist religious sects in 
England. As a result of the Toleration Act of 1689, Protestant dissenters—such as 
Quakers, Independents, and Baptists—began to enjoy a limited toleration in English 
society.  During William III’s reign, dissenters were eligible for government positions 
provided that they attended at least one Anglican church service per year.  But religious 
toleration (or the practice of tolerating liberty of worship) was by no means a universally 
accepted ideal at this time. Upon William’s death in 1702, High-Church Anglicans 
stepped up their campaign against the toleration of non-conformist religions and the 
practice of occasional conformity. In the first few weeks of Anne’s reign in 1702, and 





parliament in a bid to prevent non-conformists from taking communion in Anglican 
churches. Whigs and Tories fiercely debated the matter in print, with many Tories 
proposing the reinstitution of penalties for dissenters, and several Whigs presenting the 
case for religious toleration.  
Despite its provocative title, Masham’s Occasional Thoughts does not explicitly 
acknowledge the topical controversy about occasional conformity in England.16  But 
Masham and Locke were closely associated with an author who took part in the pamphlet 
warfare—John Shute, the first Viscount Barrington (1678-1734) and pro-tolerationist 
author of The Interest of England, &c., with some Thoughts about Occasional Conformity 
(1703), and The Rights of Protestant Dissenters (1704).  Upon hearing about Masham’s 
death in April 1708, Shute wrote to her step-daughter, Esther Masham, saying that 
It was with a degree of greif that I cannot express, yt I heard of my good Lady 
Masham’s death accidentally when I was in Town … it was wth a great deal of ease 
to my mind that I found she dy’d wthout pain, & that yu have the satisfaction to 
know, that every thing was done for her that could be.  Madam, I heartily condole 
with you upon the loss of so incomparable a Relation & so agreable a 
Companion.17 
Shute says that he revered Damaris Masham as a mother, loved her as a sister, and that 
‘by repeated Instances of a friendship of some years continuance,’ she had given the 
greatest demonstration of her tender regard and good will for him.18  Masham was also 
the friend and correspondent of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury 





Occasional Thoughts was published by the Whig publisher, Awnsham Churchill (1658-
1728), a known advocate of religious toleration.20 
Given her background and upbringing, Masham’s association with such 
supporters of toleration should not surprise us. Before her first meeting with Locke in 
about 1681, Masham had spent her early life among the theologians and philosophers at 
Cambridge University, including her father, Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), and Henry 
More (1614-87). In another letter to Limborch, dated 18 June 1691, Locke says of 
Masham that ‘as heiress to her father’s kindliness she has the greatest aversion to all 
persecution on account of religious matters’ (CJL, no. 1398). Locke undoubtedly refers to 
Cudworth’s public reputation for Arminianism, or his tolerant attitude toward religious 
differences.  In the mid-seventeenth century, the Cambridge Platonists were among the 
earliest English intellectuals to espouse the philosophy of Jacob Arminius (1560-1609), a 
theologian with a strong following in the Netherlands.  Between 1667 and 1687, 
Cudworth and More were correspondents of the Dutch Arminians, Limborch and Jean Le 
Clerc (1657-1737). These men rejected the Calvinist doctrine of predestination in favor 
of the view that all human beings have the capacity to attain salvation through their own 
efforts. Rosalie Colie highlights the fact that these views were politically controversial: 
‘Committed to a belief in free will and the Biblical foundations of truth, the Arminians 
permitted greater freedom of worship than the Reformed Church approved.’21 In her later 
years, Masham also numbered Limborch and Le Clerc among her correspondents, and 
she was an avid reader of their works.22   
Like their Dutch counterparts, the English Arminians were committed to an irenic 





Honourable House of Commons (1647), Cudworth opposes needless doctrinal disputes in 
favor of living sincerely according to Christ’s dictates.23  He emphasizes that all 
Christians are capable of obtaining salvation, regardless of their grasp of the finer points 
of theology.  Masham was undoubtedly familiar with Cudworth’s position. In a 1705 
letter to Limborch, however, Masham confesses that, as a young girl, she was puzzled 
about the exact nature of her father’s religious views. 24  She says that she was once 
troubled that her father subscribed to the Thirty-Nine Articles, when in her view they 
contained so many Calvinist principles.  Years later, she was pleased to learn that her 
father ‘had something more to say for himself.’  When asked, he said that he regretted 
once being so stupid to prefer a man for an academic post, simply because he subscribed 
to the Articles, while rejecting another (equally worthy) man simply because he held the 
beliefs that Cudworth himself now held.  The man in question was an Arminian.25 In her 
correspondence with Le Clerc, Masham subscribes to Cudworth’s views about creedal 
minimalism: she opposes quarrelling and controversy about religious matters that do not 
affect our salvation;26 and she expresses her dismay that ‘Teachers of the People’ cruelly 
attack ‘some men onely for dissenting from them in Opinions which are no Doctrines of 
Christianitie.’27 
In his Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (1660), Henry More 
expresses an even stronger political commitment than that of Cudworth. More devotes 
two chapters to ‘Liberty of Conscience’ (book 10, chapters 10 and 11), in which he 
argues that ‘there is an antecedent Right of Liberty of Conscience not to be invaded by 
the Civil Magistrate.’28  It is plain, he says, that ‘the Soveraign power of God sets the 





whatsoever.’29  As rational creatures, all human beings have the power to examine their 
religious beliefs for themselves and, if they come to dislike them, to exchange them for a 
better way of serving God.30 According to More, human beings must be permitted the 
liberty to change their religion if their conscience so dictates. He thus defends every 
man’s inviolable right to freedom in religion, ‘provided they be not degenerated into 
Atheisme and Prophaneness.’31  The power of the civil magistrate is constrained and 
limited by this common right; and it is therefore unfitting that the magistrate use external 
force in religious matters.  
Some scholars dispute the idea that Masham herself was an advocate of 
Cambridge Platonism.32  But regardless of whether or not Masham held their views as her 
own, the similarities between her religious outlook and that of the Platonists cannot be 
denied.  Above all, like Cudworth and More, she highlights the importance of a lived 
Christianity, and a religious faith grounded in reason rather than dogma.  Masham also 
echoes More’s description of liberty of conscience as an unquestionable right.  In 
Masham’s short biography of Locke, in a letter to Jean Le Clerc of 1705, she suggests 
that although not everyone agrees that toleration will bring about the public good, they 
nevertheless agree that an individual’s right to liberty of conscience should prevail: ‘God 
be thanked we are happy enough to reap a universal advantage from most mens being 
now convinc’d that Liberty of Conscience is the unquestionable Right of Mankind.’33  
The sentiment that toleration has brought about the public good, and that liberty of 






In his Letter concerning Toleration, Locke also regards liberty of conscience as 
‘every mans natural Right.’34  From late 1691 to 1704—the period of Locke’s residency 
in Masham’s home in Essex—Locke completed numerous works, including his Third 
Letter for Toleration (1692) and part of a Fourth Letter (written in 1704, and published 
posthumously in 1706).  It is reasonable to assume that Masham was familiar with 
Locke’s contributions to the subject of toleration, despite the fact that he kept his 
authorship of the Letter a secret till his death.  In the letter to Le Clerc of 1705, she makes 
her comments on liberty of conscience whilst commending Locke for his contribution ‘to 
the real Benefit of the Publick’ in terms of ‘rectifying so many mens Judgements as he 
has done, concerning Tolleration’.35  It should not surprise us, then, to hear Locke’s 
political views on liberty of conscience resonating in Masham’s work.   
 
2.  Masham on Virtue, Liberty, and the Commonwealth 
Throughout Occasional Thoughts, Masham states that her purpose is not only to 
make a contribution to the long-term happiness or good of the individual (OT, 5-6), but 
also to the prosperity of the country (OT, 2 and 232), and the flourishing of the 
commonwealth (OT, 95-6).  She observes that 
within memory this heretofore sober Nation has been debauch’d from Principles of 
Vertue and Religion, to such an excess of Vice and Prophaneness, that it has been 
Fashionable to have no shame of the grossest Immoralities, and Men have thought 
even to recommend themseves [sic] by avow’d Impiety.  A Change which could not 
be consider’d without extream regret by all who either were in earnest Christians, or 





was reason to be sensible that nothing operates so powerfully as the example of 
Princes, some have been of later Years induc’d to hope for a revolution in our 
Manners, no less advantageous than what has hitherto secur’d those Civil and 
Religious Liberties, without which it is impossible for Vertue to subsist upon any 
People whatsoever (OT, 4). 
Masham suggests that the Glorious Revolution—or the ‘Happy Revolution,’ as she calls 
it elsewhere— brought about positive political changes resulting in the security of ‘Civil 
and Religious Liberties.’36  She sees the fall of James II, and the accession of William 
and Mary, as leading the country from an age of vice and persecution to an enlightened 
age of tolerance.  True virtue, in her view, requires conditions of religious and civil 
liberty in order to flourish—conditions that the 1688-89 revolution helped to secure.  But 
Masham seems aware that, with the dawning of the age of toleration, society as a whole 
faces another challenge. If the magistrate is no longer in a position forcibly to dictate the 
religious beliefs of her subjects, then how is virtue and piety supposed to flourish in 
society?  How are subjects supposed to be directed onto the path of Christianity?  A 
corrupt society, after all, requires more than a virtuous and pious role model in order to 
bring about a revolution in manners: 
When Men’s Practices have infected their Principles and Opinions; and these have 
had time again reciprocally to confirm them in their Vicious Habits and Customs, 
the whole Constitution is corrupted; and the Personal Vertue then of the Prince 
(however conspicuous) will not, without a concurrence of other means, influence 
farther than to make (it may be) some change in the Garb, or Fashion of Men’s 





Masham intends for her book to provide a practical solution to this problem of the 
cultivation of virtue and true religion within society. She proposes a way in which 
rational creatures might habituate themselves to ‘examine their own Actions by the true 
Rules and Measures of their Duty’ (OT, 3).  God has given human beings the use of their 
reason in order to discover that law (‘the law of reason’) by which they must regulate 
their actions.  Virtue is ‘the natural result of a sincere desire to conform in all things to 
the Law set us by our Maker’ (OT, 11); and to become virtuous, we must regulate our 
‘Actions by the Universal, and Eternal Law of Right’ (OT, 24).37  Revelation has an 
important role to play in this regulation, because it provides the primary motivation to 
virtue: the express promise of eternal rewards and punishments (OT, 105).  For this 
reason, according to Masham, virtue and religion must go hand in hand.  When 
individuals stray from the law of reason and revelation, then the political order—as well 
as earthly and spiritual happiness—is placed in jeopardy.  ‘Those  Breaches of the Eternal 
Law of Reason … disorder Common-wealths and Kingdoms; disturb the Peace of 
Families; and make by far the greatest part of the Private Infelicities of Particular Persons 
in this World.’  They also ‘render Men miserable in a future Life’ (OT, 2). 
 Masham’s principal solution concerns the proper education of members of 
society, and the bulk of her book is an account of the principles upon which such an 
education must be based.  She mentions the importance of executing just laws against 
immorality and ‘prophaneness,’ but ‘a right care had of Education,’ she says, ‘is the only 
humane means of making People truly Vertuous’ (OT, 5). 
Whenever our inferiour Magistrates shall be such as will be a terror to Evil doers, 





is in their power to procure to their Children more valuable Treasures than Riches 
and Honours; the ancient Vertue of our Ancestors will then quickly be equall’d, if 
not surpass’d, by that of their Posterity: But till then, it is in vain to expect that any 
great Advances should be made toward an Amendment, as necessary to our present 
and National, as to our Personal and Future Happiness (OT, 5-6). 
When a due regard is had for education, ‘Commonwealths and Kingdoms have 
flourished, and become famous’ (OT, 6). 
The first principle of a good education is that every individual must be permitted 
the liberty to examine and to question their moral and religious beliefs for themselves.  In 
a letter to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, dated 8 August 1704, Masham says that ‘as I am a 
true English woman, I cannot but naturally have a Passion for Libertie in all senses.’38  
By ‘all senses’ of the word, Masham seems to mean liberty in its political, religious, and 
philosophical senses—she draws on all three concepts to support her case in Occasional 
Thoughts. First, in the political sense of liberty, Masham argues that every individual 
must be free from the threat of external force or coercion when it comes to their religious 
beliefs.  On this subject, Masham’s arguments bear some similarity to those of John 
Locke.  In his Letter concerning Toleration, Locke presents several arguments in favor of 
the toleration of non-conformists in England. He begins by asserting the religious view 
that God has placed each man’s salvation in his own hands, and that attaining this 
salvation requires that a man have an ‘inward and full perswasion of the mind.’39  For this 
reason, God has never given ‘such Authority to one Man over another, as to compell 
anyone to his Religion.’40  God requires individuals to come to the true religion through 





also rely on an epistemological point: the idea that ‘Such is the nature of the 
Understanding, that it cannot be compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward force.’41  
Locke says that while someone might compel us to act as though we believe in the 
Christian religion—through penalties and threats, for example—no one can force us into 
believing the articles of faith: ‘It is only Light and Evidence that can work a change in 
Mens Opinions.’42  Locke points out that while magistrates might be born into certain 
privileges of wealth and power, these privileges do not extend to a certain knowledge of 
the one true religion: ‘The one only narrow way which leads to Heaven is not better 
known to the Magistrate than to private Persons and therefore I cannot safely take him for 
my Guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is 
less concerned for my salvation than I myself am.’43 So the magistrate simply does not 
have the authority to ask someone to quit the light of their reason, and ‘blindly resign up 
themselves to the Will of their Governors.’44  If this were the case, then ‘Men would owe 
their eternal Happiness or Misery to the place of their Nativity,’ and their salvation would 
be merely a matter of chance. 45  
In sum, Locke holds that it is pointless and unfitting for the magistrate to force 
unbelievers into an outward show of conformity to the state religion.  An individual’s 
salvation and acceptance before God depends upon an inward sincerity, not the outward 
appearance of faith; and ‘men cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no.’46  
The use of force against unbelievers is likely to lead only to dissent, revolution, and war. 
‘Just and moderate Governments,’ Locke says, ‘are every where quiet, every where safe.  
But Oppression raises Ferments, and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasie and 





legal granting of liberty of conscience, is the best path to take for the sake of peace and 
security in the commonwealth. 
Masham does not explicitly refer to Locke’s Letter concerning Toleration, though 
she does cite ‘a late Treatise intitled The reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in 
the Scriptures’ (OT, 109), and ‘Mr. L—s excellent Treatise of Education’ (OT, 185).  
There are also oblique references to the epistemology of the Essay concerning Human 
Understanding.48  Nevertheless, like Locke in the Letter, Masham subscribes to the view 
that coercion and penalties should not be used as ways of inducing religious belief; that 
God requires individuals to attain salvation through their own efforts, and not by blindly 
following the dictates of others; and that the granting of liberty of conscience helps to 
maintain the order and well-being of political society. 
To begin with, Masham opposes the use of punishment for religious doubts. She 
highlights the tale of ‘a good Lady of the Church of Rome’ who instructs her child in the 
doctrine of transubstantiation. When the girl expresses her disbelief, her mother replies 
‘What? do you not believe in Transubstantiation?  You are a naughty Girl, and must be 
whip’d’ (OT, 39). Masham observes that ‘instead of having their reasonable Inquiries 
satisfy’d, and incourag’d, Children are ordinarily rebuk’d for making any’ (OT, 39-40). 
Such practices are not confined to Catholic nations alone. ‘We generally indeed exclaim 
against the Cruelties of the Roman Church exercis’d over Men, on account or pretence of 
Religion.  And it is true, that they have excell’d herein; yet all Parties among us, 
proportionally to the extent of their Power, have practis’d the same thing, and the Best, 
when restrain’d from it by the Civil Magistrate, make it evidently appear, that they bear 





beyond the punishment of children to the punitive practices of those with political 
authority. It is reasonable to suppose that Masham alludes to the political climate in early 
eighteenth-century England, in which some parties were eager to reintroduce penalties for 
dissenters. Against such a stance, Masham maintains that, even in the early education of 
children, the imposing of penalties for religious doubts can have negative consequences.  
This is because, after a short time, children dare not question their religious teachers, and 
simply profess that ‘that they do Believe whatever their Teacher tells them they must 
Believe, whilst in Truth they remain in an ignorant unbelief’ (OT, 39-40). An implicit 
faith can be potentially harmful for both the individual and society: in the first case, the 
individual is left vulnerable to the ‘the most pitiful Arguments of the Atheistical’ and her 
salvation is thus placed at risk (OT, 39); in the second, the country is exposed to all the 
political upheavals that necessarily result from atheism and scepticism. If an individual is 
uninformed about the rational principles underlying her beliefs, then she might come to 
believe that ‘All Religions are, alike, the Inventions and Artifices of cunning Men to 
govern the World by; unworthy of imposing upon such as have their good Sense: That 
Fools only, and Ignorants are kept in Awe, and restrained by their Precepts’ (OT, 209). 
 Masham’s principal reasons for opposing punishment and cruelties for religious 
doubts diverge from those of Locke. She does not make the epistemological point that 
religious belief is involuntary, or that the magistrate does not have certain knowledge of 
the one true religion, but rather highlights the negative social and spiritual consequences 
of expecting children to believe without knowing why.  Her point is not that religious 
belief cannot be forced, but rather that it should not be forced, for pragmatic or 





is detrimental to political stability.  Locke did not extend toleration to atheists on the 
grounds that ‘Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, 
can have no hold upon an Atheist’.49  Atheists were therefore a threat to the peace and 
security of the state, and did not have the right to be tolerated. Likewise, in Masham’s 
view, the spread of atheism threatens to ruin the government. Religious belief should not 
be forced upon individuals, she says, because the fear of punishment is likely to lead to a 
blind faith, and this, in turn, has the potential to lead to atheism. Those who are 
‘accustom’d to Believe without any Evidence of Reason for what they Believe’ (OT, 31) 
are more susceptible to the belief that there is no God. And a ‘general Contempt of 
Religion towards God’, Masham says, is always a forerunner of ‘approaching Ruine to 
the best and most flourishing Governments which have been in the World’ (OT, 232).  
Masham also maintains that virtue should not be defined in terms of passive 
obedience to the national church or to the dictates of one’s country: 
By a Vertuous Man, in all Countries of the World, or less Societies of Men, is 
commonly meant, by those who so call any one, such a Man as steadily adheres to 
that Rule of his Actions which is establish’d for a Rule in his Country Tribe, or 
Society, be that what it will.  Hence it has been that Vertue has in different Times 
and Places chang’d Face, and sometimes so far, as that what has been esteem’d 
Vertue in one Age, and in one Country, has been look’d upon as quite the contrary 
in others (OT, 84-5; see also 96). 
This historical fact, about the markedly different (and sometimes contradictory) 
definitions of virtue in different periods and countries, provides further support for 





to believe. In such countries, ‘the Injunctions of some Lawgiver’ (OT, 85) are considered 
obligatory—not because they are ‘Precepts of the Eternal Law of Right,’ but because they 
are ‘part of the Law, or Fashion of that Country, or Society’ (OT, 86).  While this places 
an obligation of obedience upon men, their obligation is not based upon fixed and 
immutable moral rules, and it is therefore precarious.  Masham defines a virtuous man in 
rather different terms: in her view, he is a man who judges what is right and wrong by 
‘the true rule of Reason’ (OT, 96).  The measure of the virtuous man’s actions is the law 
of reason, which is ‘no Arbitrary thing, it being founded on Relations, and Connexions, 
which are as immutable as that determinate constitution in Things, which makes 
everything what it is’ (OT, 98).  Likewise, a religious man cannot be someone ‘whose 
Interest it has been to keep up the Credit and Authority of vain Traditions and 
superstitious Practices’ (OT, 97). Religion and virtue, in other words, need to be 
distinguished from ‘the most Arbitrary Institutions of Men’ in order to be stable and 
lasting in society (OT, 100).  Otherwise a Christian can give no more reason for his 
beliefs and practices than ‘a Mahumetan’—that is, that ‘their God fathers and God 
mothers ingag’d for them that they should believe so’ (OT, 47).  This statement partly 
echoes Locke’s view that an individual’s religion should not simply be a matter of that 
‘which either Ignorance, Ambition, or Superstition had chanced to establish in the 
Countries where they were born.’50 
For Masham, a rational education is the key to bringing about a truly virtuous 
society. She emphasizes that children should never be rebuked for having doubts about 
their religious instruction.  Teachers must endeavor to remove such doubts with solid 





beliefs for themselves (OT, 41).  In other words, Masham advocates religious liberty, or 
the freedom to believe and worship as the individual sees fit.  She recommends that 
It should … be effectually Taught, and not in Words alone, That it is our Duty to 
study and examine the Scriptures, to the end of seeing therein what God requires of 
us to believe, and to do.  But none are effectually, or sincerely taught this, if 
notwithstanding that this is sometimes told them, they are yet not left at liberty to 
believe, or not believe, according to what, upon examination, appears to them to be 
the sense of the Scriptures (OT, 44). 
Children should have ‘a liberty of fairly examining’ (OT, 45), so that they never come to 
believe that their religious instruction has been an imposition upon their reason.  This 
practice is necessary in order to preclude men becoming unbelievers. Here again 
Masham’s sentiments are reminiscent of those of Locke in the Letter.  She emphasizes 
that the individual’s primary duty is to determine what God requires us to believe and to 
do, and that this duty has priority over any duty to terrestrial authorities, including 
parents, teachers, and other spiritual directors. 
 
3. Masham’s Argument for Women’s Education 
We now turn to Masham’s principal solution to the practical problem of bringing about a 
reformation of manners in a corrupt society: the intellectual education of women.  As we 
have seen, Masham suggests that the legal granting of political and religious liberty, in 
itself, is not sufficient to set men on the right path to virtue.  She observes that 
Before we come to such a ripeness of understanding as to be capable by unassisted 





together with the obligations we are under to comply therewithal, an evil indulgence 
of our Inclinations has commonly establish’d Habits in us too strong to be over-
rul’d by the Force of Arguments (OT, 53). 
Masham describes the common human tendency to act in opposition to what our reason 
tells us is the morally best thing to do, a condition that ancient philosophers call akrasia.  
In such cases, the freedom to question our beliefs, and to subject them to the light of our 
reason, is not enough to make us virtuous agents, because we might already be disposed 
to moral weakness in so far as our reason is hopelessly enslaved by our passions and 
appetites. This ‘enslavement’ accounts for the fact that virtue tends to wear different 
‘faces’ in different cultures and periods. Despite the universality of reason, human beings 
fail to embrace the eternal and immutable principles of morality because their habitual 
inclinations are corrupted in their early years (by their culture and cultural leaders or their 
families and educators, and so on). The right instruction regarding virtue thus requires not 
only ‘good Principles’ but also the inculcation of ‘early Habits’ (OT, sig. A3r). 
One of the central theses of Masham’s book is that if women are educated to 
become wise and virtuous, then this will contribute to the flourishing of the nation.  As 
educated beings, and in their capacity as mothers, women will be able to impart a useful 
education to their offspring.  Masham says that 
But natural Affection apart, it should be consider’d by these, that no one is Born 
into the World to live idly; enjoying the Fruit and Benefit of other Peoples Labours, 
without contributing reciprocally some way or other, to the good of the Community 
answerably to that Station wherein God (the common Father of all) has plac’d them, 





Members of the same Body, useful every one each to other in their respective 
places.  Now in what can Women whose Condition puts them above all the 
Necessities or Cares of a mean or scanty Fortune, at once so honourably and so 
usefully, both to themselves and others, be employ’d in as in looking after the 
Education and Instruction of their own Children? (OT, 180) 
Masham’s proposal applies to all women, including those among the ‘common People,’ 
since ‘the Relation between Mother and Child is equal amongst all Ranks of people’ (OT, 
177). But Masham directs her main suggestions to the ‘superior ranks of Persons’ (OT, 
160). She believes that it is especially important for ‘ladies of quality’ to assist those 
members of society who are likely to be of consequence to the commonwealth (OT, 180), 
and who will play a part in the making and executing of laws (OT, 170).  
In their capacity as mothers, women have a profoundly significant role to play in 
society, in so far as they have a ‘strong and unalterable influence upon their [children’s] 
future Inclinations and Passions’ (OT, 8).  From a young age, children must be taught to 
use their reason in order to overcome the temptations of ‘present pleasure.’  As flesh and 
blood, every human being faces the difficulty that our ‘love of present pleasure’ and our 
immediate desires subject our reason ‘to an Unjust and Arbitrary Dominion … A thing 
manifest not only in the instances here and there, but in the examples of whole Nations’ 
(OT, 83).  But, as human beings, we are also free agents in the philosophical sense of 
being at liberty to act or not to act in accordance with our reason.  Masham says that 
We being then indu’d, as we are … with a liberty of acting, or not, suitably and 
agreeably hereunto; whence we can, according to the preference of our own minds, 





(manifested in his works no less than the will of any humane architect is in his) it 
follows, that to act answerably to the nature of such beings as we are, requires that 
we attentively examine, and consider the several natures of things, so far as they 
have any relation to our actions (OT, 64-5). 
God has given us ‘Freedom or Liberty of Action’ (OT, 69-70), such that we might either 
act contrary to the will of God or attain self-excellence through our own efforts.  The 
attainment of self-excellence requires an attentive examination of alternatives, so that we 
might choose the path that will best ensure our long-term happiness.  The involvement of 
mothers in early childhood education is conducive toward ‘the right forming of the 
Minds’ of both sexes (OT, 8). If a woman herself has some training in languages, 
religion, and ‘the useful Sciences’ (OT, 192), and she assists in her child’s tuition for the 
first decade or so, then this is bound to have a positive influence on the child’s moral 
development. She will act as a positive intellectual role model for her child to learn from. 
But a woman’s education has intrinsic as well as instrumental value. Regardless 
of sex and social status, religion is ‘the Duty of all Persons to understand’ (OT, 159); and 
to meet this duty, women must improve their understandings.  Yet most women could not 
even explain the grounds of their Christian faith to ‘a rational Heathen’ (OT, 161).  As a 
matter of custom, a woman is expected only ‘to believe and practice what she is taught at 
Church, or in such Books of Piety as shall be recommended to her by her Parents, or 
some Spiritual Director’ (OT, 207).  She therefore has the same reason for going to an 
Anglican Church as she would ‘have had to go to Mass, or even to the Synagogue,’ had 
she been brought up a Catholic or a Jew (OT, 208). As a consequence, women are easily 





out of religion altogether.  For the sake of their salvation, women need to grasp the 
underlying principles of the Christian religion and the reasons for their faith. Keeping 
them in the dark is in fact an ‘injustice’ to women (OT, 191). 
For if Christianity be a Religion from God, and Women have Souls to be sav’d as 
well as Men; to know what this Religion consists in, and to understand the grounds 
on which it is to be receiv’d, can be no more than necessary Knowledge to a 
Woman, as well as to a Man (OT, 166). 
Women require the same freedom of conscience or freedom of worship that is the 
birthright of all human beings.  Christian women need to be taught that ‘what they have 
learn’d to be their Duty is not grounded upon the uncertain and variable Opinion of Men’ 
(OT, 17). 
Once again, Masham’s point is that human beings are obliged to determine the 
nature of their duties to God for themselves. These spiritual duties have priority over any 
duties that women might have to their earthly superiors, including men as a social group. 
Women should not be brought up to have ‘such a Notion of Honour as if the Praise of 
Men ought to be the Supreme Object of their Desires, and the great Motive with them to 
Vertue’ (OT, 21).  Rather, women should be permitted the freedom to think for 
themselves and to interpret the Scriptures by the light of their reason.  In this way, they 
will be duly protected from the specious arguments of sceptics and atheists; and in this 
way, a Christian commonwealth might be truly safeguarded against the twin threats of 






In his 1691 letter to Limborch, Locke tells of Damaris Masham’s opposition to 
ecclesiastical tyranny and to ‘force in matters of religion’ (CJL, no. 1429).  In her 
Occasional Thoughts, we see this opposition expressed in writing.  Though Masham’s 
work is not typically interpreted as a political text, in it Masham demonstrates a 
commitment to several key tolerationist principles.  She argues that, in order to be truly 
virtuous, and to live a life in conformity with God’s will, human beings require the 
freedom to search the Scriptures for themselves, and to understand why they believe the 
Christian religion.  If individuals do not have freedom of conscience (or freedom of 
worship), and are forced into an implicit faith, or into simply believing without knowing 
why, then they are more likely to fall prey to atheism and scepticism.  This fall from true 
virtue and Christianity can have negative consequences for both the individual and for 
civil society—the spread of atheism can be the harbinger of ruin for a nation.  Thus, 
according to Masham, human beings should not be forced or compelled into their 
religious beliefs by their superiors—their spiritual duty (to obtain salvation) should 
always have precedence over any duty of obedience that they might have to earthly 
authorities. 
Masham’s ideas have much in common with those of Locke and his colleagues in 
the late seventeenth-century republic of letters. In his Letter concerning Toleration, 
Locke regards liberty of conscience as ‘every mans natural Right’, provided that they do 
not disturb the peace and security of civil society.51  By ‘every man,’ it is natural to 
suppose that Locke means ‘every human being’, and that his tolerationist ethic extends to 
women as well as men. But Locke’s explicit stance on the subject of women and liberty 





Paul to the Corinthians (first published posthumously in 1706), Locke attempts to 
reconcile two seemingly contradictory propositions: first, the Apostle’s declaration that 
women are forbidden to speak in church; and second, the view that women should be 
covered when they pray or prophesy in church.  Locke explains the first proposition as a 
means of averting the suspicion that the Christian religion ‘took away the Subordination 
of the Sexes, and set Women at Liberty from their natural Subjection to the Man.’52  In 
the second case, Locke argues that St Paul permits women to pray or prophesy in church 
only when they are endowed with ‘extraordinary Gifts given by the Spirit of God.’53  But 
even then, they must cover their heads so that ‘the Subjection of their Sex should not be 
forgotten.’54  With these remarks, Locke appears to affirm that ordinary women, without 
any special calling from God, are not permitted to be spiritual ‘Teachers and Instructers’ 
of the people.55  And when it comes to public religious worship, women must bow to the 
spiritual authority of men, and never act upon the ‘Knowledge or Presumption of their 
own Abilities.’56  It is possible, of course, that Locke thought that women could pursue 
religious worship in private without deferring to the ‘Superiority and Dominion of the 
Man.’57  But even so, it is difficult to reconcile his remarks in the Paraphrase and Notes 
with the idea that women have a universal right to pursue their own religious worship as 
their conscience so dictates.   
By contrast, Masham points out that without the liberty to examine and 
understand the Scriptures according to her own reason, each woman’s salvation is 
dependent merely upon the chance religious persuasion of her husband or father. For 
Masham, this is unacceptable: the implicit faith of women, like the implicit faith of men, 





a rational education such that they might be able to make a positive contribution to the 
moral and political well-being of future generations. She points out that, among her 
contemporaries, even the most solicitous about education have ‘employ’d their care 
herein but by halves,’ because ‘the information and improvement of the Understanding 
by useful Knowledge (a thing highly necessary to the right regulation of the Manners) is 
commonly very little thought of in reference to one whole Sex’ (OT, 7).  Yet a woman’s 
education is important for the sake of her own spiritual welfare, as well as the welfare of 
the nation. 
It is unlikely that Masham intended to provide a critique of Locke’s views about 
women—there is certainly no textual evidence that she meant to challenge Locke’s 
claims about women’s natural subordination to men.58  It remains, however, that with her 
own contribution to the early modern republic of letters, Masham took a step further than 
Locke.  By including women among those whose ‘Birthright it is not blindly to Believe, 
but to Examine their Religion’ (OT, 171), Masham explicitly extends the tolerationist 
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